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CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES FACING THE
FIRST AMENDMENT'S RELIGION CLAUSES
TODD RAKOFF

We are here this afternoon to discuss Justice Brennan and the freedom of religion. As moderator, my basic task is to recognize speakers;
but as one of the older people in the room, I thought I might first say a
word about how different the world was when Justice Brennan was appointed to the Court in 1956.
At that time, I was in elementary school in Philadelphia. Like all
other classes in Pennsylvania public schools at that time, we started the
day with a Bible reading. As I am Jewish, this was no problem for me
when we read from Genesis or the Psalms, but it was not so fine when
we read from the Gospels or Corinthians. We also sang the Lord's
Prayer in assembly. At this remove, it is astonishing to think that that is
what was happening in the public schools.
Justice Brennan's first major Free Exercise opinion involved a Seventh Day Adventist in South Carolina who was denied unemployment
compensation after she was fired for refusing to work on Saturdays.! It
is clear from what he wrote, that Justice Brennan had the same ability
regarding religious belief that he had in other matters: 2 the ability to appreciate the point of view of the excluded. He saw (unlike the court below) that a Seventh Day Adventist's refusing to work on Saturday was
different from refusing to work merely for a personal reason. And he
understood that members of the majority religion in South Carolina did
not have to face her dilemma, since by law all places of work were
closed on Sunday anyway.
Justice Brennan favored considerable government accommodation of
individual and minority religious practices. He also favored a strict wall
of separation in establishment cases, such as those involving legislative
prayer or, to come back to where I started, Bible reading in the schools.
The panel today, however, is not being asked to think about the relationship between religion and the Constitution in 1956, but rather about it
in the present. And without further ado, I am going to let them begin.

1. See Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
2. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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STEVEN GREEN
As I understand the purpose of this session, it is not to concentrate on
the legacy and career of Justice Brennan but to discuss where church and
state law is heading. It is difficult, however, for me not to be somewhat
retrospective. As a historian and an advocate of the principle of separation of church and state, and a supporter of the Court's jurisprudence
from the late 1940s to the late 1980s, I spend much of my time defending
the vitality of past case law and arguing why those decisions are still
relevant-why those holdings and principles fashioned, in large part, by
Justice Brennan still matter.
Few lawyers or scholars would disagree that the Court's more recent
approach to church-state law, as with other types of civil and expressive
rights, has been evolving. Principles and legal standards that many of us
hoped were secure are now under attack.
I am reminded of a conversation I had with Justice Harry Blackmun
several years ago, not long after he retired from the Supreme Court. I
mentioned that I had had the privilege of filing several briefs before the
Court and that he had agreed with our position in every case. With a
smile and an impish glint in his eyes he said: "And I bet you lost most of
those cases."
By that point in his tenure, of course, Justice Blackmun had all but
adopted Justice Brennan's position on church and state and, as he acknowledged, he had been on the losing end of many cases. The Brennan
legacy continues on the Court in the person of Justice David Souter,
President Bush's first mistake in a judicial appointment. Yet despite
Justice Souter's willingness to take up the separationist cause, we have
seen a shift in the Court's perspective on church-state issues, a change
that has been at least twelve years in the making.
The "new mantra" or paradigm for church-state adjudication is
"neutrality." The word "new" belongs in quotations because, despite
what some conservative scholars are now claiming, the concept of neutrality in church-state law is quite old. For more than thirty-five years, at
least as far back as the 1963 school prayer case, the Court has spoken in
terms of neutrality? One can go back even farther to the first modem
Establishment Clause case-the Everson parochial school busing
case--where the Court embraced the separationist position with some of
3. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,226 (1963).
4. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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the strongest language imaginable: "No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
what ever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion .... In the words of Jefferson, the clause ... was
intended to erect a wall of separation between Church and State." 5 Yet,
despite its unconditional language, the Court upheld reimbursements for
parochial school transportation, noting that states could not exclude individuals from receiving public welfare benefits because of their faith.6
Neutrality, or evenhandedness, as Justice Souter terms it, prevailed. 7 The
word has been part of our church-state nomenclature ever since.
To be sure, when Justice Scalia and Justice Souter each speak of
neutrality, they have different concepts in mind. The notion of "neutrality" is truly a shibboleth: all people can embrace neutrality without giving up their ideological perspectives. As Professor Douglas Laycock has
observed, we can all agree on the value of neutrality without agreeing on
anything at all.8 On its own, neutrality has little substantive meaning; it
gains substance only when it is referenced to the values the religion
clauses were intended to advance, such as autonomy of religious decision
making and the non-advancement of religious ideals. 9 When the Court
spoke of neutrality toward religion during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, it
was not in the strict or formal sense advocated by Professor Philip Kurland-where religion is treated exactly the same as everything else, where
it is neither advantaged under the Free Exercise Clause or disabled under
the Establishment Clause. 10 Rather, it was a tempered form of neutrality-one that looked to preserving an equilibrium by reducing government contacts and conflicts with religion-more similar to Professor

5.

Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).

6. See id.
7. "(The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with
at 18.
groups of religious believers and non-believers." Id.
8. "Because neutrality requires so much further specification, it cannot be the only
principle in the religion clauses. Nor can it be the most fundamental. We must specify
the content of neutrality by looking to other principles in the religion clauses." Douglas
Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39

DEPAUL L. REV. 993,998 (1990).
9. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (identifying three main
evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to guard: "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity").
10. See Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CFH.
L. REV. 1 (1961).
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Laycock's notion of "substantive neutrality," a concept that served as a
complement to the no-funding principle.
Since the 1980s, however, due primarily to shifting political majorities, the Court has been moving away from this counterbalance of neutrality and separation to a paradigm of strict neutrality. The impact of
this shift has been most dramatic in the Free Exercise arena with the
1990 Employment Division v. Smith case." In Smith, the Court reversed
thirty years of precedent by holding that governments no longer had to2
justify burdens on religious practice by showing a compelling interest.'
The earlier standard (set out by Justice Brennan) had recognized that
even neutral laws could have a disproportionate impact on religious
practice and that the law should sometimes bend and accommodate nontraditional practices that rarely had the same access to the political process as majority religions. 3 Under the new understanding of neutrality,
however, religion is not entitled to any special protection, only equal
treatment.
In the Establishment Clause area, we have seen rumblings of strict
neutrality, but so far, the Court has only ventured to the edge of that
precipice. In the challenge to the Adolescent Family Life Act' ten years
ago, the so-called "chastity act," the Court held that the Establishment
Clause did not prevent religious groups from participating in grant programs that were ideologically neutral and generally available to all
groups.' 5 At the same time, however, the justices reaffirmed that groups
that were pervasively religious were prohibited from receiving government funding, and remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether federal funds were being "used to fund 'specifically religious
activit[ies] in an otherwise substantially secular setting."" 6 Thus, notwithstanding the breadth of the program, the Court held that religious
uses of federal funds would still be unconstitutional. Justice O'Connor
underscored this point in her concurrence by emphasizing that "any use
of public funds to promote religious doctrines violates the Establishment

11.
12.
13.
14.
amended
15.
16.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
See id.at 885-86.
See, e.g., Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398,403-04 (1963).
Adolescent Family Life Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 578 (codified as
at 42 U.S.C. § 300z).
See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1988).
Id. at 621 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,743 (1973)).
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Clause."
Several years later in 1993, the Court relied on neutrality in holding
that a hearing-impaired student could use a publicly paid sign language
interpreter in a parochial school, even though all acknowledged that the
interpreter would be translating some religious doctrine." While highlighting the neutrality of the program, the Court felt compelled to emphasize the discrete nature of the service (that the program did not relieve
sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne in educating
their students), and that no public funds reached the coffers of the religious school.1 9 The state was not subsidizing religious education, the
Court insisted, even though under an evenhanded approach, that should
not have mattered. Then three years ago, the Court held that principles
of neutrality prohibited the University of Virginia from denying funding
to a student religious magazine when it funded all other student publications.20 Once again, the Court split hairs by distinguishing the student
activity fee from a general program arising under a taxing statute." The
majority also insisted that it was not authorizing the funding of religious
activity but only student speech. 22 Most curiously, the Court undermined
the principle of neutrality by reaffirming that there are "special Establishment Clause dangers where the government makes direct money
payments to sectarian institutions... even under a neutral program that
includes nonsectarian recipients. '' 3
So where does this leave us? In my remaining time let me speak of
two areas where this developing notion of neutrality is most evident and
most problematic.
First, as set out in Rosenbergerv. University of Virginia,24 what we
are seeing is a blurring of content and viewpoint distinctions in the free
speech area, such that religion is now being viewed not as a distinct form
or category of expression but merely as another perspective. It is becoming increasingly difficult for local governments to create limited fo17.
18.
19.
20.

ld.at 623 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993).
See id. at 10, 12.
See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 846

(1995).
21. See id. at 840-41.
22. See id. at 840.
23. Id. at 842.
24. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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rums for particular categories of speech without facing claims that they
are discriminating against religious perspectives that fall within those
same categories.2 In essence, when religion is no different from everything else, it must be provided the same access. While that theorem may
not present a problem in a quintessential public forum such as a city
park, it is very problematic in a public school classroom. School officials should be able to invite an astronomer to address an assembly about
the stars without being forced to invite an evangelist to speak about his
concept of the heavens.
I believe, as did the Framers, that religion is qualitatively different
from other ideologies or philosophies, such that it represents more than
merely another viewpoint or perspective. Because of its unique position
in the Constitution, religion is sometimes entitled to special protection
from governmental burdens while, at the same time, it is sometimes excluded from participating in benefits that are otherwise available to the
public.
The second area where we are seeing this equal treatment argument
is in the area of funding of religious institutions. Certainly, the traditional battlefield in this area has been parochial school funding, and now
it is with the issue of private school vouchers.2 6 Two principles are at
work with vouchers. The first is neutrality: that the funding program
must be ideologically neutral and generally available to parents of both
public and private school students. In essence, the Court has required
that funding programs cannot be skewed toward religion or create an incentive for religious education. Most voucher proposals fail this neutrality requirement because they are limited to private schools. Public
school parents do not realize any benefit.
The oldest and most familiar voucher program, the Milwaukee plan,
is limited solely to private schools, which has been one of its legal shortcomings. 27 This lack of evenhandedness is endemic to most voucher
proposals as public education is generally free. The most interesting
voucher cases are taking place in Vermont and Maine, where several
smaller schools districts do not operate their own schools but send their

25. See, e.g., Church on the Rock v. Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 1996).
26. See generally Thomas Toch & Warren Cohen, Public Education:A Monopoly
No Longer, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 23, 1998, at 25; see also Catherine
Candinsky, Trustees Tackle School Vouchers Issue, COLUMBUS DIsPATcH (Ohio), Sept.
29, 1998, at IA.
27. See, e.g., Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
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children to adjoining public schools. 28 Since the school districts already
pay tuition for all students, even for some to attend private nonreligious
schools, the neutrality argument is much more compelling.
The second principle underlying vouchers is that of "private choice."
This too has become a mantra of recent Establishment Clause scholarship. The theory here, of course, is that by making payments to parents
or other third parties who then in turn use the funds to pay for tuition at
the private school, the government is removed as an actor or sponsor of
the religious education-that the money flows to the religious school only
as a result of the private choices of the recipients. I would argue, as we
have done in all of the voucher cases, that the parents serve merely as
conduits for the payment of public funds to religious schools.
The Court has yet to consider a voucher case. 29 Voucher advocates
have thus been forced to glean authority from other cases. The Court has
upheld a tax deduction that included private school tuition, 30 has allowed
a blind student to sue his disability scholarship to attend a Bible college, 3' and allowed a hearing-impaired student to use a state-paid sign
language interpreter in a parochial school. 32 Although in each case the
Court spoke in terms of neutrality and private choice, it always qualified
its holdings by insisting that the public funds were not being used to advance religion. While these distinctions may be intellectually inconsistent, as a litigator, I take the Court at its word.
So far, the legal track record on vouchers has been mixed. Religious
school voucher programs have been struck down in Puerto Rico, Ohio,
Vermont, and Maine but have been upheld recently in Wisconsin. 33 We
have filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court in the Wisconsin case, so we may have an answer shortly on the constitutionality of
vouchers and the meaning of neutrality.
Part of the inconsistency in reasoning and holdings lies in the underlying flaw in the neutrality argument: it proves too much. If neutral28. See Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Vermont Dep't of Educ., No. S0478-96
RcC (Vt. Super. Ct. June 27, 1997); Bagley v. Maine Dep't of Educ., No. CV-97-484
(Me. Super. Ct., Apr. 20, 1998); Strout v. Commissioner, Maine Dep't of Educ., No. 97259-P-H (D. Me., Aug. 11, 1998).

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See Toch & Cohen, supra note 26, at 25.
See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602,632 (Wis. 1998).
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ity is all that is required, then there is no bar to paying public funds directly to religious schools. A voucher or third-party mechanism would
be unnecessary. But the concept of paying for religious activity, including worship and instruction, strikes most people as being at odds with
our constitutional traditions. As Justice O'Connor iterated in Rosenberger,34 the neutrality and no-funding principles are "of equal historical and
jurisprudential pedigree., 35 The Court's neutrality decisions "provide no
precedent for the use of public funds to finance religious activities. 3 6
On the other side, many people may say that equal funding of religious
schools is only fair and is long overdue. Despite the conflict in perspective, no one can deny that the principle of neutrality, if fully embraced,
would constitute a dramatic change in church-state jurisprudence. The
next one or two Court terms should provide some answers as to whether
we are about to experience a watershed in church-state law.
MARTHA MINOW

It is a special honor to join in celebrating Justice Brennan. Justice
Brennan had the rare capacity to make whomever he talked with feel like
a unique person. This capacity informed his understanding of "dignity,"
a word much discussed this morning. Justice Brennan believed that the
Constitution, augmented by the Bill of Rights and the Civil Rights
amendments, is a sparkling vision of the human dignity of every individual. He lived that sparking vision.
Some critics this morning warned that Justice Brennan's vision risks
departure from the proper constraints on liberty and the divided powers,
established by the Constitution. In contrast, I think their vision constrains the unbridled liberty of some at the expense of others. In addition, it constrains the allocation of power in ways that would ensure protections only for the relatively powerful. Justice Brennan instead maintained regard for every group, for every perspective, for the powerless as
well as the powerful, and for the Constitutional guarantees that apply to
everyone.
Justice Brennan's treatment of religious issues illuminated this attention to multiple perspectives, as Todd Rakoff described. Justice
Brennan respected both believers and non-believers. It was with both

34. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
35. Id. at 849 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 847.
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in
perspectives vividly in mind that he wrote his eighty-page concurrence
37 case, where he rejected prayer in public schools. 38
the Schempp
Later, when asked to name the most difficult case he ever decided,
he pointed to Schempp. "The position I finally took," he said, "took a
long time to come around to. In the face of my whole lifelong experience as a Roman Catholic, to say that prayer was not an appropriate thing
in public schools, that gave me quite a hard time. I struggled. ' 9
A justice who struggles not to impose his own point of view is a justice who can implement a commitment to the dignity of others. Justice
Brennan, had he participated in the Court's recent cases in free exercise
and the establishment of religion, would be both more expansive in protecting the rights of individuals to exercise their own religions and more
vigilant in guarding a separation between church and state. After all, he
dissented from the Court's rejection of Simcha Goldman's efforts to
wear a yarmulke while in Air Force uniform. 4° He dissented from the
approval of a city's use of the nativity scene in a Christmas disCourt's
4
play. '
The current Court is less willing to require accommodation for individuals who subscribe to minority religions, and the current Court is less
concerned about close state connections with dominant religions. It is
precisely such a drift that should concern someone committed to the dignity of all individuals regardless of their status as members of minority or
majority groups.
I want to keep that concern foremost as I turn to some current issues.
We are witnessing a tidal change in the social welfare state. Devolution
of responsibility to local authorities accompanies profound withdrawal of
public responsibility, most notably, the elimination of the entitlement to
economic relief for the poor.
In America and globally, we live amidst the most expansive period
for the metaphor and reality of the economic market. The "market" is
used to measure the worth and then to drive the movement of persons as
37. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bren-

nan, J.,
concurring).
38. See id. at 230-304.
39. Jeffrey T. Leeds, A Life on the Court, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 5, 1986, § 6, at 25.
dis40. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 513-24 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
senting).
41. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694-726 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissent-

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 43

well as capital across state and national borders. "Market forces" rip
people and jobs from their moorings. Any social, political, or cultural
practices that stand in the way of markets or individual consumer choice
must fall to ensure that "markets" are free. The rhetoric of choice and
competition permeates every area-from prisons to genetic testing-but
no area more than schooling.
Here, market language converges with the desire of parents and children for maximal individual freedom to choose their kind of schooling
and specific schools.
Magnet schools and charter schools, both funded inside the public
system, expand parental choice beyond the neighborhood school. Tax
credits and vouchers for private schools use public resources to stretch
the range of choices even further. Legislation for vouchers, scholarships,
and tax credits to enable the selection of private schools is pending in
fourteen states. Cases challenging such plans are pending in several
states. We are in the midst of a major public reconsideration of the relationship between the state and private choice in schooling.
This development, in turn, is closely linked to growing efforts by religious groups and individuals to enlarge the role of religion in the public
square. Such groups support cutbacks in the welfare state by pointing to
private charity as a preferable means to meet the needs of the poor.
Religiously motivated campaigns for vouchers and tax credits clearly
aim to assist parochial schools. Religious values can also be invoked to
challenge the encroaching market and the commercialization of everyday
life. So religion and markets at times seem at odds and at times seem
joined. Whatever the tensions, and shifting bedfellows, a variety of people assert that religiously informed viewpoints belong in political debate
and in public decision making.
That assertion takes issue with the theories and practices that demarcate public life from private worlds of religious beliefs and practices.
Spokespersons associated with both the left and right wings in American
and European politics urge efforts to strengthen civil society, taken to
mean the institutions, associations, and practices that occupy and enrich
realms between individuals in the state. Emerging democracies, such as
those in Eastern Europe, need to cultivate civil society if they wish to
wean fully from the state-dominated economies and social life. Freemarket industrialized societies also need to nurture civil society because
its decline seems linked to diminishing political participation, volunteer
service, and civility across groups.
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Robert Putnam, here at Harvard, is among those who waht to enlarge
settings where people can engage in mutual aid and mutual recreation
apart from either the market or the polity. Communitarian critiques of
liberalism similarly point to the inadequacy of relations purely between
distinct individuals and the State, or between individuals and the market.
At least one legal constraint sets some limits on all these arguments
for renewed civil and society group affiliations, at least if the government
is to play a role in the renewal. The First Amendment directs that no law
establish religion, and that no law prohibit the free exercise of religion.
Freedom from state religion and freedom to exercise religion are in fact
the very first rights mentioned in the Bill of Rights. These rights do not
appear after freedoms of association and assembly or guarantees of
equality. It was prescient of the Framers to anticipate that relations between state and religion would be vital 200 years later.
Interpreting the religion clauses, however, proves truly vexing. Are
the two clauses independent? Do restrictions on establishing religion
collide with assurances permitting the free exercise of religion?
I am not sure whether these questions have general answers. Yet,
there is a basic commitment, associated with Justice Brennan, to guard
against a kind of interdependence between religion and state that makes
it impossible for people to exercise their own beliefs, or, for different
religions to sustain old and new affiliates.
Brennan emphasized that the religious composition of today's population makes us an even more diverse people than those in the world
imagined by the Framers, who knew only differences among Protestant
sects. "Today, the nation is far more heterogeneous religiously."42 For
example, there are more Muslims in America than Episcopalians. 43 Accordingly, the state's relation to religion must be modified to acknowledge who actually lives here.
Under circumstances of the past, present, or future, a separation between religion and state is not possible. Even the most stringent efforts
for strict separation would have to engage the government in defining the
scope of religion.
The prevailing, though much battered, doctrine in the establishment
arena concedes that strict separation is not even the goal. Although un-

42. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 240 (Brennan, I., concurring).
43. See Colin C. Haley, Recognizing Diversity; Business Begins to Include All
Faiths in Marking Holidays, PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.), Dec. 19, 1998, at 21.
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der challenge, the Supreme Court's test in Lemon v. Kurtzman44 represents the most separatist view in current debate over the religion clauses,
and yet even it never called for absolute separation. Its three-prong
test,45 announced in assessing whether a state statute is constitutional,
asks first, does the provision not have a secular purpose? Second, is the
provision's primary effect to aid religion? Third, does the provision result in excessive government entanglement? If any prong of this test can
be answered affirmatively, the provision will be struck down.46
The term "excessive" is most notable. The doctrine itself contemplates some entanglement, but how much? The use of "excessive"
means that some is permissible. Now even this less-than-absolute separation is under challenge. At least five members of the Court think that
the Lemon test should be scrapped to allow more breathing room for, and
state accommodation of, religion. The Lemon test has not been invoked
successfully in over ten years. The trend lowers the wall even further to
permit public involvement with religion.
Against this backdrop now we must ask how should the country
navigate two pending developments: schemes to permit the use of public
funds to pay for children's education in schools, and welfare reforms that
invite states to turn responsibility to religious entities with public dollars?
Because Steve discussed vouchers so thoroughly, my own assessment emphasizes the private choice argument about whether the fact of
private choice making by parents or consumers sufficiently insulates
government from wrongly aiding religion. If private individuals decide
to spend in religious settings the government money obtained through tax
breaks, scholarships, or vouchers, then it is plausible to view those measures as enhancing private choice, rather than as establishing religion to
governmental means.
Entwining public aid with parental choice may not only insulate that
aid from an Establishment Clause violation, but may go so far as to require equal support to assist all parents' choices. Parental prerogatives
about children's education are among the most fundamental liberty values accorded to individuals in their roles as parents. Courts similarly
have decided that a parent's decision to refuse medical treatment for their
hospitalized child does not trigger a hospital's obligation to ensure care

44. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
45.
46.

See id. at 612-13.
See id. at 613.
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47
because the parents, and not the hospital, made the treatment decision.
Akhil Amar and Michael McConnell suggest that private parental
choice making in the school context is so important as to require equalization. Thus, if a state authorizes school vouchers permitting private
election of secular private schools, such programs must extend to religious schools. Otherwise, parents who preferred religious schools could
claim a burden on their free exercise of religion or else they could argue
that the discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause. There is
something to this argument.
Putting these pieces together, I do predict that federal courts will reject facial challenges to voucher schemes that include religious schools.
Then a successful challenge to voucher programs or tax relief that extends to religious schools would have to involve details of its application.
For example, if most tax relief vouchers were directed to particular religious schools or to schools of particular denominations, then the law's
application could be defective under the Establishment Clause. The
challenge even then would be a long shot, difficult to prove.
Shifting to the second context of welfare reform, the Charitable
Choice provision of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, otherwise known as the Welfare Reform
Ace s (the "Act"), requires even more complex constitutional analysis.
The Act authorizes states to pay religious agencies directly for welfare services through contracts-for-service. It also authorizes states to
pay individual recipients through vouchers to be redeemed for services
by private entities contracted with the state. Those private entities include religious agencies. The most significant restraint has a dual character: the allocation of public dollars must not impair the religious character of such agencies and must not diminish the religious freedom of the
beneficiaries.
Congress barely discussed the Charitable Choice provision. It was
rarely mentioned in public debates. Too many other issues were on the
table in the midst of "ending welfare as we know it." The charitable
choice element was sponsored by Senator John Ashcroft, who, as a
presidential aspirant, explicitly desires to bring religion much more into

47. See generally ROBERT D. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN HEALTH CARE LAw 419 (7th
ed. 1996).
48. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).

NEW YORK

4WSCHOOL LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 43

the public sphere.
The Charitable Choice provision differs from prior prevailing practices in the field of social services, although public/private partnerships
have long connected government with religious entities. Every state and
locality, often with federal funds, routinely contracts with Catholic
charities, Jewish welfare leagues, and other religious counterparts to provide much, if not most, of the state child-welfare services and other human services.
Those contracts, in the past, connected the state with the service arms
of religious organizations, not with churches directly. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, however, permits
direct state connection with the religious arms of these organizations.
The Act applies to temporary public assistance programs. According to
some interpretations, it may apply to food stamps, Medicaid, and Social
Security Insurance, through service and voucher arrangements.
The Act specifies that states cannot exclude religious organizations
from receiving vouchers. In so doing, the law protects the religious
character of the faith-based organizations. Such organizations are exempt from Title VI's ban on religious discrimination in hiring. They are
permitted to maintain their art and their symbols, and to prescribe the
clothing that their staffs wear.
As a result, crosses remain on walls and case workers wear habits
and cassocks. Can workers also pray in the presence of applicants for
services? The law specifically does not fund worship directly with state
monies, although wholly religious activities might be permitted if the
services are purchased by voucher.
Yet, when a private individual elects to obtain welfare services
through Catholic charities, the connection is not a private one. The Act's
inclusion of pervasively religious organizations tightens the link between
the public and religion even more than past public funding of human
services provided by religious organizations.
Indeed, it is precisely their pervasively religious character that commends such organizations to advocates of welfare reform. The fullest
defense was inspired by Marvin Olasky, author of The Tragedy of
American Compassion4 9 Olasky calls for the replacement of welfare
because the government's displacement of religious charity undermines
the spiritual and moral capacities of individuals.
49.

MARvIN OLAsKY, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN COMPASSION

(1992).
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More practically, he and others argue that meeting the needs of the
poor, of drug addicts, of pregnant teenagers, and so forth, requires spiritual renewal. Accordingly, welfare reform turns to religious organizations.
Will religious organizations be able to give full force to the religious
dimension of rehabilitation services? Olasky himself now urges religious organizations to resist taking the money. He argues that the Act
applies too many restrictions.
Religious organizations around the country are divided about
whether to participate with states under the Act. One challenge that
awaits is that if only some religious organizations participate, then the
participating religions might become in some way more established than
the non-participating ones.
Besides affording a fascinating window into contemporary debates
over religion in this country, these patterns suggest some very important
and challenging scenarios. Suppose, for example, that the only local
provider of services is a religious organization that requires participation
in a religious activity before picking up the stipend or providing the basket of foods. Or suppose that participation in religious activity, if not
required, is nonetheless encouraged.
The Act says that the states must ensure beneficiaries the option to
opt out of religiously provided services. 50 The Act does not require notification to recipients of bad theory option. Moreover, nothing in the Act
deals with the potentially coercive effects on a dependent person who
needs assistance.
In sum, the constitutional questions posed by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act are much more serious
than those posed by the voucher issue in the school context, and vouchers in the welfare context could raise new questions for the school context.
LAWRENCE SAGER

I want to begin by announcing that Justice Brennan is indeed my
constitutional hero. It is important that I declare this at the outset, because my remarks could aptly be titled, "Forgetting and Advancing Justice Brennan's Vision of Religious Liberty."
To connect religious liberty with the underlying values that have
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(e).
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been so prominently associated with Justice Brennan-namely, the dignity of the individual and a concern for the powerless-one has to discard
the dominant metaphor of Justice Brennan's religious liberty jurisprudence. One must reject, root and branch, the metaphor of separation,
and turn in its place to equality. Indeed, I will argue for a somewhat
more precise notion of equality, namely, equal regard. This is not to
deny the specialness of religion, but rather to insist that the specialness of
religion consists of its peculiar vulnerability to a denial of equal regard.
In these remarks I will first attempt to exorcise the model of separation, and then to suggest the lines along which an equal regard model of
religious liberty should proceed. This approach ultimately serves the
ends that mattered most to Justice Brennan, but at a cost to much of his
doctrinal architecture in this area of constitutional law.
The idea of separating church and state, in the modem state, is on its
face deeply implausible. Churches, religious groups, and religiously
motivated individuals buy, sell, and own real estate. They enter into and
seek the enforcement of contracts. They drive cars. And, just as we all
do, they rely on police, fire, and sanitation services.
In no sensible way can we conceive of churches as separate from the
rest of a modem western society. Pursuit of the implausible metaphor of
separation has produced two striking lines of analysis, each wrong
headed on its own and deeply inconsistent with the other.
The first line of analysis stems from an important case, the outcome
but not the rationale of which I celebrate: Sherbert v. Verner5' in 1963,
(To anticipate later remarks, Sherbert and the three other cases in the
unemployment52compensation area can easily be defended on equal regard grounds.)
Under the formal Sherbert doctrine, individuals who pursue religious
projects are essentially sovereigns among us. Subject only to the extreme justification of the compelling-state-interest test, they are constitutionally entitled to be exempt from general, even-handed laws, enacted
without hostility or particular insensitivity to their needs, simply by virtue of their religious motivation.
The first thing to observe about Sherbert is that it was never taken

51. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
52. See Thomas v. Review Bd. Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Unemployment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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seriously by the Supreme Court. The compelling-state-interest test has
been described as strict in theory and fatal in fact. Here, it was strict in
theory and notoriously feeble in fact. In the twenty-seven years in which
Sherbert was the normal rule, the Court almost always found either that
the test was satisfied or for some reason inapplicable.
There were two small exceptions to this pervasive pattern: One consisted of three cases which, like Sherbert itself, involved unemployment
insurance claimants. So Sherbert spawned a remarkable constitutional
rule whose effective life was largely confined to unemployment insurance cases. The only other exception was Wisconsin v. Yoder.53 Here, I
want to plead in the alternative: either Wisconsin v. Yoder was wrong;
or, more likely, it was right because the Constitution gives all parents
authority to make reasonable, coherent, systematic judgments about their
children's education-whether or not they are motivated by religious beliefs.
So we have Yoder, a case that has to either be re-explained or set
aside, and the Sherbert quartet of unemployment cases. In every other
case the rule of Sherbert was honored only in the breach. For twentyseven years the Supreme Court ran from its own doctrine. It is easy to
see why.
Sherbert failed because, in a pluralistic democracy concerned with
individual dignity and the rights of all persons, it makes no normative
sense to privilege one set of deep personal commitments over all others.
The notion that religious commitments are inevitably more important
that a person's commitment to her family, to her art, to her most deeply
held political views, or to her other powerful passions and commitments,
is simply not consistent with our constitutional order.
Justice Scalia's rhetoric in Smith54 may well have been unnecessarily
inflammatory; and he surely overlooked the role that equal regard might
play in a case like Smith. But he was right about two key points. First,
the Sherbert view of the right of religiously-motivated persons to disregard legal restrictions the rest of us are obliged to respect never really
was the rule under which the Court operated. And second, such a rule
would be an anomaly 55 in our constitutional order.
So we can set aside one remarkable idea spawned by the metaphor of

53. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
54. Unemployment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
55. See id. at 886.
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separation, the idea that religiously-motivated persons are sovereigns
among us. The other remarkable idea spawned by separation is on the
anti-establishment rather than the free exercise side of the ledger.
(A parenthetical observation is in order here: I am dubious about
treating the free exercise and establishment clauses as sponsoring distinct
and potentially conflicting principles. The Establishment Clause after
all, was more or less invented by the Supreme Court in 1947, in Everson. 56 It would have been odd in the extreme for the modem Court suddenly to have crafted a principle at war with its jurisprudence of religious
liberty. We should presume that the Court chose a principle that complemented or supported rather than undermined its extent jurisprudence.
So I am nervous about interpretations of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses that place them at odds with each other.)
In any event, the principle spawned by the metaphor of separation on
the Establishment Clause side of the line, was this: Something bad happens whenever dollars leave the public fisc and somehow make their way
to religious enterprises or into the hands of individuals who use those
dollars to embark on religious projects.
The various doctrines implicated by this principle have been ably
explored here today by Mr. Green and Professor Minow. These doctrines have in common a strong resistance to the migration of public
dollars to religious enterprise, even when the dollars are devoted to
secular purposes and distributed even-handedly to both secular and religious enterprises in the name of those purposes. This imposes a unique
and unjust disability of religious persons and organizations.
Consider the plight of parents who choose to send their children to
parochial schools: We have a strong constitutional attachment to the idea
of parental choice in schooling, and would think that something had gone
very much awry if such a choice were not available. But separationists
are prepared to starve parents who elect parochial schools and those
schools themselves of public support, even when that support comes in
even-handed form and is inspired by secular concerns.
The metaphor of separation thus has sponsored both the remarkable
and indefensible privileging of religious believers under Sherbert and the
drastic disabling of religious organizations and religiously motivated persons under Lemon. Each of these principles was implausible and unjust
standing alone. When you put the two together an even less attractive

56.

Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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picture emerges: an irrational privilege coupled with an irrational disability. To the charge of injustice we now must add the complaint of
inconsistency.
To understand the full depth of this inconsistency, consider the one
proposition that almost everyone within the religious liberty area agrees
with: Special subsidies to churches are unconstitutional. Programs that
single out churches for material benefits are renounced by all as inconsistent with religious liberty.
But if special subsidies to religious enterprises are unconstitutional,
how can we justify the privileging of religiously motivated behavior
promised in Sherbert?5 7 Sherbert, after all, was ultimately about financial loss or gain, and so are most of the cases comprehended by the Sherbert principle.
As an equality case, Sherbert can easily be reconciled with the antisubsidy principle: There is no special perquisite of religion being recognized; rather the Court is insisting that a minority religious practice be
shown equal regard with mainstream religious belief as well as with deep
secular needs. But as a separation case, Sherbert looks exactly like a
special subsidy to religious believers, permitting them, and them alone,
to pursue their personal projects with state support. This is perhaps even
clearer in land use cases like the St. Bartholomew's controversy, where
a church invoked Sherbert principles to justify building a large commercial structure in defiance of landmark preservation laws. So inconsistency stalked Sherbert and the model of separation on which it rested
from the outset. And when we add to the indefensible privilege of Sherbert the equally indefensible disabling of churches from receiving public
funds, we see what a remarkable shambles the metaphor separation has
made of the law of religious liberty.
As has already become clear in today's discussion, most modem Supreme Court cases substantially abandon the model of separation. That
abandonment begins with Smith, and is reinforced, if not vindicated, in
City of Boerne v. Flores,59 which declares the Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional on enumerated powers grounds. Smith survived Boerne as good law. It is also clearly correct in its rejection of

57. Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
58. St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991).
59. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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separation.
The retreat from separation was continued in the Court's recent decision in Agostini,6° which directly reversed Aguilar6' on essentially the
same facts, and ruled that it was now permissible to put remedial teachers in parochial school classrooms.6 2 The most dramatic sign of the
abandonment of separation came in Rosenberger,6 3 where the Court
found free expression principles to require the University of Virginia to
fund a religious student publication.
The Court has not merely moved away from separation; it has moved
towards equality. The Court continues to recognize religion as special
under the Constitution-but special in its vulnerability to discrimination.
The move does not yet have a stable, conceptual identity, in part because
of the odd half-commitments of Justices O'Connor and Stevens. Justice
Stevens holds the equality view in the free exercise arena, but clings to
separation on the establishment side. Justice O'Connor holds the converse view: She is deeply committed to the Sherbert v. Verner line of
cases but has an equality-driven view of the Establishment Clause...
hence her opinion in Kiryas Joel.64
I now want to offer an equality approach to religious liberty, turning
on the ideal of equal regard. Equal regard insists that no person should
be devalued as a member of our political community on account of their
religious beliefs or affiliations. Equal regard comprehends three more
specific propositions. First, the deep commitments and interest of minority religious believers must be treated with the same regard as the
deep interests and commitments of other citizens, both majority religious
believers and other citizens who have secular commitments. We have to
worry that minority religious beliefs and commitments will not be met
with equal regard, in part because of outright hostility and in part because of a kind of peculiar tone deafness: Religious beliefs do not necessarily rest on common epistemologies, and it is often very hard for an
outsider to understand the grip that religious views have on members of
an outlying set.

60.

Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).

61.

Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).

62. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 236.
63. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
64. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 712-21 (1994)

(O'Connor, J., concurring).
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This aspect of equal regard is what the Court in Smith missed, and
that omission is what makes Smith only half right. Inquiries into this
core aspect of equal regard will often be very difficult, and not surprisingly, some of the most important defenses of this aspect of equal regard
have come from legislatures rather than courts. For example, Congress
has made great efforts to protect the rights of Native American church
members to ingest peyote. Congress overturned66 the yamulke case.67
Lyng, 68 which upheld a road siting decision that cut off an entire religion's access to a vital holy spot, was overturned by Congress. 69 And
many states have been extremely generous to churches, granting them
blanket exemptions from various land use restrictions.
Courts too have an important role to play in policing this aspect of
equal regard, but it is a role that will generally require a close and careful
inquiry into fact. The extreme prophylaxis of the compelling state interest test may be appropriate in particular contexts. Unemployment insurance may be such a context: Critical unemployment insurance decisions
are made by administrative tribunals that have few standards to guide
them and that are essentially unreviewable; good cause claimants like
those in the Sherbert line present a profile that presumptively entitles
them to benefits; and, it is sensible to worry (even to presume) that the
refusal of such benefits to such claimants is the product of discrimination. But contexts like these are rare. Normally, the compelling-stateinterest test is inappropriately strong medicine.
So we come to the second more specific principle of equal regard:
Public programs, including funding programs, must be defensible for
public reasons. The justifications must be accessible and endorsable by
all members of our political community.
The third principle of equal regard is this: the government must
avoid encouraging members of our political community to devalue others

65. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(a)(2) (stating that ceremonial use of peyote by Indians
has been protected by federal regulation since 1965).
66. See 10 U.S.C. § 774 (authorizing military personnel to wear items of religious
apparel while in uniform except in circumstances where it is determined that the wearing
of the item would interfere with the performance of the member's military duties, or, that
the item of apparel is not neat and conservative).
67. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
68. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
69. See Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§
3001-3013; see also Exec. Order No. 13,007, 3 C.F.R. 196 (1996).
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whose religious beliefs and affiliations are different than their own. This
is what best explains our constitutional antipathy to some religious displays. It also explains what otherwise would seem an absurd result in the
Lynch v. Donnell ° case, where the presence of a plastic reindeer garnish
encouraged the Court to permit the display of a creche.
The anti-divisiveness principle of equal regard is particularly important in public school controversies. Much thought must be devoted to
what can be permitted and what must be excluded from public-school
classrooms to keep government from increasing division and encouraging a spirit hostile to equal regard. But it is this principle that explains
why many of the cases that Steven Green mentioned have a powerful and
sympathetic appeal.
In closing, let me say that I am surprised to find myself applauding
the contemporary Court's disinclination in recent religion clause cases to
follow Justice Brennan's lead. But I want to emphasize that this is an
instance of ignoring Justice Brennan's doctrinal instructions to best save
his moral legacy. The move from separation to a consummated jurisprudence of equal regard ultimately does no disservice to Justice Brennan
and the values for which he most deeply stood. Thank you.
TODD RAKOFF

Thank you very much. It is apparent that the panel members could
argue with each other for quite a while. I prefer to have questions from
the audience. I shall give priority to students if the students have any
questions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER ONE

In many of your discussions on school vouchers, it appears that you
view the status quo as neutral if you say that we are starting from the
viewpoint of free public education and you get a check only if you are
religious, whereas if you are going to public school you are getting a full
education. Can you explain?
STEVEN GREEN

What I tried to suggest in my argument about vouchers and the concept of neutrality, is if this is where the Court is going, then you do not
need third-party payees.
70.

465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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If you treat everything the same, then why not just write the check
out directly to the religious schools? The choice mechanism is faulty, at
least within the context of private religious schools at the elementary and
secondary level. Because, unlike the collegiate level, where everybody
pays tuition whether it is a large state university, community college,
private school, or religious school, there is a lack of choice at the precollege level.
In most parts of the country, choice does not exist. It is either public
school or fundamentalist Christian school. In addition, it is not really the
individual's money. Rather, it is money given in a quid pro quo for the
money to go to the religious school.
There is a degree of dishonesty involved in the voucher and choice
arguments, because the parents' money is not involved. In all the states
where vouchers have been enacted so far, the check is always restrictively endorsed, or made payable to the parochial school. The checks are
transmitted through third-party payees.
Because parents cannot spend the money on a vacation or on a down
payment for a house or a car, it is really not their money. If we are going
to fund religious schools, let's fund them. The voucher system is really
just a way to make everybody feel good: that you are helping private
schools while respecting the Constitution. In reality, though, the vouchers do not effect any changes. When the states in the South tried to do
the same thing thirty-five years ago, in reaction to Brown v. Board of
Education,71 the Supreme Court held that vouchers were the government's money.72 Vouchers are still the government's money.
MARTHA MINOW

I do not like vouchers, but analytically I cannot support Steve's argument. I differ not on the entanglement point, but rather on the private
choice point.
When a Catholic hospital receives a check from Medicaid, we do not
say we have a problem of governmental support of religion. The method
for delivering of services in this country, which Larry Sager alluded to,
requires private election of religiously affiliated services. That is how
our system works. We would have to eliminate a vast amount of the
services that public dollars currently support. Yet an array of religiously
71. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
72. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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affiliated and secular providers exist for health and human services outside the public systems. If the only options available for private vouchers in the school context are parochial schools, then the voucher appears
to be an intentional subsidy, and I find that problematic.
You could argue that it is just a matter of time; if you create a
voucher scheme, then in time it will generate options for schooling.
Certainly new supply, new private market-based assumptions like this
infuse public discourse in the area of schools. I would be interested,
though, in trying to multiply the choices inside the public frame. Charter
and magnet schools use choice and competition without abandoning the
notion of public, common schools.
Although I see the need for broad experiments to improve schooling,
my knee-jerk reaction against vouchers relates to my commitment to the
dream of the common school; this dream, however, is in great jeopardy,
and the source of jeopardy is the failure of the public schools, not the
innovations of the religious claims.
LAWRENCE SAGER

I do not like the idea of vouchers. The question is whether the use of
public money distributed under these principles is a violation of the Constitution? Steven Green is surely right: vouchers distribute public
money, and it does not matter to whom the check is made payable. But
if public money is distributed to religious groups only because some
parents choose to send their children to religious schools, then it does not
violate any of the three principles of equal regard, including the antidivisiveness principle.
I prefer public schools. Indeed, the Constitution prefers public
schools. At their best, they promote unity and equal regard rather than
disharmony and subordination. But this falls short of a claim that vouchers are unconstitutional. Public money is reaching religion pockets, but
not as a result of a public decision that directly demotes anyone's stature
in the eyes of herself or her community.
Some voucher-like arrangements may indeed be unconstitutional.
Professor Minow's examples of religious welfare agencies to which a
beneficiary of public assistance must submit herself and under the aegis
of which she may be required to engage in religious practices (like
prayer) not of her own choosing, are deeply objectionable on religious
liberty grounds. But so long as public schools remain available as a viable option, school vouchers will not present that sort of situation. In
some fact situations, however, there may be no viable public school al-
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ternatives, and that would be constitutionally catastrophic. It would require students to submit themselves to religious educational regimes that
were not of their choosing.
AUDIENCE MEMBER TWO

Do you advocate eliminating the metaphor of separation in the lay
person's sense? In the sense that people outside academia can understand it and as I can understand it, separation stands for our nation's determination to not let religions exercise the power of the sovereign on
their own behalf. That, I think, is what has caused so much bloodshed in
history and continues to threaten us most in our own time. Do you advocate eliminating separation in this sense?
LAWRENCE SAGER

In terms you describe, I do not. On the other hand, it is difficult to
know what it means for religion to exercise the power of the sovereign.
For example, I do not subscribe to the view that people who bring their
religiously inspired commitments into the public square have somehow
violated our constitutional norms or that they should be ignored. Public
decisions and projects have to be defensible in terms of public reason.
But that does not exclude the voices of those who are prompted by their
religious commitments to offer public reasons. It is both impractical and
intolerable that religiously motivated persons be disabled from coming
into the public space and mounting arguments of general importance. It
would be outrageous to think that the abolitionists, who drew on their
deep Christian roots but then made arguments accessible in principle to
everyone in the society, were somehow doing violence to our constitutional values.
So the ambition of keeping religions from owning the sovereign is a
complicated idea. But the norms of equal regard-as- I have described
them, and if satisfactorily and honestly applied-would bar religions
from capturing the sovereign in the sinister sense. If that is what separation means to you, then in this limited sense, I oppose separation.
But I return to this point: the broader idea of separation has spawned
a set of unjust ideas, ideas that involve themselves with matters far outside the critical threat you are worried about.
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AUDIENCE MEMBER THREE

In Grendel's Den,73 is it significant that the delegee was a church?
Should the state be able to delegate its sovereign powers to religious organizations? Does this create an equal regard problem?
LAWRENCE SAGER

The best way to understand the outcome in Grendel's Den is either
as a case barring the delegation of public power to private persons or as a
case singling out religious organizations for the special privilege of exercising public power.
That the delegee of this authority was a church need not have been
the basis of the Grendel's Den decision. The idea of taking organizations-the Democratic Party, a union, or the Federalist Society-and giving that organization a public private right to control land use decisions,
is wrong in principle. An early zoning case-Eubank v. City of Richmond 74-- can be read as saying exactly that.
The religious identity of the delegee would matter on an alternative
rationale for the outcome in Grendel'sDen. On this alternative rationale,
the complaint would be that religious groups were being privileged as
against other groups in this conferral of public land-use authority.
MARTHA MINOW
Most of your equal regard argument sounds very plausible to me, but
unless we retain the basic commitment that the state cannot delegate its
sovereign powers to religious organizations, then we abandon any idea of
the anti-establishment clause.
I am impressed enough by the failures of top-down governmental
regulation and provision to support flexibility and experimentation in
delegating to many entities functions that once upon a time were sovereign. But if we do not draw the line at religious organizations, we are in
trouble.
The anti-delegation principle explains Grendels' Den. It is the best
explanation of Kiryas Joel," a decision with which I disagree, but its

73.
74.
75.

Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
226 U.S. 137 (1912).
Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 712-21 (1994)

(O'Connor, J., concurring).
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best rationale was its opposition to delegating the function of public education to a religious group.
Similarly, the delegation argument offers the best challenge (if it is
correct factually) to welfare reform. If it ends up being understood as
giving the states' function to private religious organizations, that is
where it is going to be very vulnerable.
LAWRENCE SAGER

Let us be very clear. Delegation of public zoning authority to religious organizations is intolerable, but the anti-delegation principle has to
be more broadly defined: It is not a principle unique to religious delegations. Alternatively, a delegation of such authority that singled out religious organizations would be pernicious on the grounds that it indefensibly privileged religious entities.

